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WATERLOO:

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE.

BLUCHER ≈ WELLINGTON ≈ NAPOLEON.



By J. WATTS DE PEYSTER,

BREV. MAJ.-GEN. S. N. Y., A.M., LL.D., LITT. D.

NEW YORK:
CHAS. H. LUDWIG & CO., PRINTERS, 10 & 12 READE STREET.
1893.



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Louvain
Tirlemont
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Maestricht
Renaix
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Enghien
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Nivelles
Genape
Gentines
Braine le Comte
Soignies
Ouaire Braz
Tilly
Marbais
Gembloux
Herons
Huy
Lens
Frasne
Villiers Perrain
Sombres
Mazy
Mons
Namur
The Meuse
Part of Belgium illustrating Campaign of Waterloo
Valenciennes
Binch
Fontaine l'Eveque
Charleroi
Marchienne
Gerpinnes
Ham-sur-Lure
Merbes le Chateau
Sobre sur Sambre
Maubeuge
Dinant
Beaumont
Philippeville
Marche
Landrecy
Avesnes
Charlemont
Givet
The Sambre
The Lesse
The Dyle
The Meuse

WATERLOO:

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE.

BLUCHER—WELLINGTON—NAPOLEON.

"TOUT D'UNE VOLÉE."

"That whole nations believe is no evidence of truth."

JACOBUS DUSCH.

"In Harren und Krieg,
In Sturz und Sieg,
Bewuszt und gross!
So risz er uns
Vom Feinde los."

"In wistful waiting and war,
In disaster and victory,
Self-knowing and great!
So tore he us loose (or free)
From the enemy."

GOETHE on BLUCHER.

"England thinks there is no character like WELLINGTON, in his acts arising from loyalty and duty to his sovereign and country. In this he was remarkable, but he is matched fully by Belisarius."

"Great conquerors are shameless. They are simply outlaws. A man more destitute of regard for decency, moral or physical, than NAPOLEON BONAPARTE never lived. Peter the Great was the same, and Charles V. not much better."

JAMES SHEPHERD PIKE.

BY

ANCHOR.

NEW YORK:

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1893.

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

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THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.

"A VOL D'OISEAU."

By Brev.-Maj.-Gen. J. WATTS de PEYSTER, S. N. Y., 1866.

The false reputation of Napoleon, which saved him at the Berezina and at other places, still imposes upon the majority of the reading world. Napoleon returned from Elba in response to a treasonable invitation fomented by his emissaries and partisans, which permeated society, although the base was to be "found in the licentious devotion of the French legions" (Md. 5). The contemptuous feeling that expressed itself in the slur that Louis XVIII. came back among the baggage of the conquering Allies; that he was surrounded by a set who had learned nothing and had forgotten nothing, who were, as a rule, under the influence of priests, to govern a people brought up to despise religion and bow to military despotism; deprived the restored monarch of a respect which might have availed much to counteract the efforts in favor of Bonaparte. Marshal Soult has been suspected of materially facilitating the progress of the usurper (Md. 25), and as Minister of War he had sufficient opportunities to do so if he chose. Throughout Europe his connivance has been generally believed. Soult echeloned 50,000 men along the Rhone, in southeastern France, ostensibly against Murat in Italy, which were the very troops that Napoleon found ready to his hand, advancing towards Lyons and Paris. It is strange how individuals of scarcely any account in themselves; in crises loom up in gigantic proportions as the representatives of factions and parties. Labedoyere, who was afterwards justly shot for his treason, was the spark which kindled the conflagration quenched in the blood of Waterloo. This Colonel Labedoyere belonged to the very class which of all others was accounted as devoted to the royal family. His treason to heredity and environment astonished Napoleon, as

manifested by his exclamation when Labedoyere threw down the traditional Bourbon white flag, blazoned with fleurs de lys, to be trampled under the feet of Napoleon's horse, "What! M. Labedoyere, a gentleman! I did not think myself so powerful!" The regiment, of which the flag was thus outraged and dishonored, followed the example of the colonel, and the other regiments its example (Md. 52). Thus the army brought back Napoleon, not the people—the peace-seeking producing classes. He was afraid of the people, and manifested that fear in a variety of ways.

Writers as a rule sneer at the Royal government for not being able to present more opposition to Napoleon on his march from Cannes to Paris. A French writer, who took an accurate view of this astonishing success, made a very pertinent remark—"It was much easier for the Allies *not* to have sent Bonaparte to Elba [but to a St. Helena where he could have done no more mischief], than it was for Louis XVIII. to prevent his progress from Elba to Paris." The most false magnanimity wasted the fruits of the most glorious success, as did the Union North, when, with a stupidity unexampled, it threw back the control of the country into the hands of the Rebel South and its abettors—the power they had lost and forfeited by their treason, unexampled in being without an excuse.

Napoleon, on repossession of power, has been glorified for the rapidity with which he reorganized his armies. This, in some respects, is utter exaggeration, if not absolute falsehood. It cannot compare with the resurrection of Prussia in arms to oppose him in 1812–13, or 1815, or the formation of the Union armies in the Fall of 1861, not to mention the Rebel armies which acted against the latter, considering that in the United States everything had to be provided, nay, improvised, to convert masses of men into an army. No one seems to remember that France was swarming with experienced officers and soldiers; "running over" with military men, who, in the language of Davoust, "were accustomed to the trade of war," and "who, as they had no other trade, preferred [that] occupation to indigence." When it is considered that Napoleon required every man he could bring together to strike the blow in Belgium which he knew was to be decisive of the

event in his favor, if he had any reasonable chance at all, it is unaccountable to observe, *not* that he took with him so many, but so few, to meet Wellington and Blucher. He might have taken with him Rapp's 20,000 (*Gardner*, 9, *note*) without any injury to his cause, because the Russians, Bavarians and Austrians, to whom Rapp presented a phantom of resistance, did not cross the Rhine in force until after Waterloo had decided the question at once and forever. Again, he left 20,000, including a portion of his very Guard, under Lamarque, in La Vendee, when 10,000, or even less, would have been all-sufficient for the time being, because terrorising Morand (Md., 177–8) held the Royalists in check, and Fouche, a double traitor, had the sense to see, and the duplicity to convince the leaders of the King's party, that premature activity was a mere waste of life, since the result entirely depended on the *remote* possibility—if any there was—of Napoleon's triumph in Belgium.

It is an indisputable truth, in the prosecution of warlike enterprises, that TIME is THE element of inestimable value. "In war a few minutes more or less make or mar." On an occasion similar to Blucher's withdrawal from Ligny (Vaudemont's famous retreat before Villeroy, in 1695), "Time fled, and with it victory." The loss or waste of time in war is simply unpardonable, and yet Napoleon, who knew this, and who more than once emphasized the fact; who declared, "Hesitations and half measures ruin everything in War;" and who had won his greatest triumphs by the utmost improvement of days and hours and minutes, failed in Belgium from incomprehensible delays and waste of time—all chargeable to himself and himself alone —which would have been unpardonable in a tyro at the trade of war. Gen. Gerard "deplored the incomprehensible, the irremediable delays."

In his aggressions against the Prussians and Anglo-Allies in Belgium there were four, or even, perhaps, five lines of operation which Napoleon might have followed. The allied forces were very much dispersed, extending dislocated over a sinuous front of 200 miles. Jomini and others are of opinion that he should have chosen the third or the one next to the most easterly, the fourth line, descended the Meuse, and plunged into the midst of Blucher's scat-

tered forces, instead of attacking where he did, by Charleroy, the point to which Blucher and Wellington would naturally or inevitably converge to protect Brussels. To fall upon Blucher's forces, sprawled out, would have been most judicious, because Wellington, from his nature, would not have come promptly to the assistance of Blucher towards Namur or Liege, any more than he did at Ligny; no, he would not have hastened in the way that Blucher helped Wellington out of his scrape at Waterloo. The Napoleon of 1814 would have repeated in June, 1815, his master stroke of February of the preceding year, which even Clausewitz, the ultra-Prussian, declares, if followed up, would have retrieved Napoleon's fortunes. If he had concentrated his forces in May on his right, fallen through the Ardennes like a thunderbolt into the midst of Blucher's dislocated corps and divisions, and defeated them in detail, he could have destroyed the Prussian forces effectively before Wellington could have arrived to Blucher's relief (Ropes, 197, says: "Wellington wholly unprepared to assist his ally"). The roads in this direction were as good as those which he did follow, and were so much better than those upon which he moved to victory in February, 1814, that their superiority is incalculable, without taking into consideration that June has always been accounted, from the earliest ages, the best month for military operations, and February about the worst. In this offensive, from and with his right, he could have concentrated sufficient troops with as much speed and facility as he did on the centre, and could have drawn without difficulty Rapp's corps, or army, and every man in that direction disposable for active service, to his assistance. The writer has examined the best maps *of the time*, and every authority which money or perseverance could procure; also owned or controlled hundreds, and has had access to many more, and if he were an officer of the highest rank, who could attract the attention and win the confidence of the public, he could prove to them that his opinion is correct. On the same principle Grant should have turned Lee's left in May, 1864; Lee should have turned Meade's left in July, 1863, as Bragg's left was turned later, on Mission, or Missionary, Ridge in November, 1863.

It is a moot-point whether or not the Allies were surprised by Napoleon. To say that they were (especially Wellington), so excites the bile of the admirers of the "Iron Duke" that he is a bold man who even insinuates that he was. The decision of the question depends on the definition of surprise. It was an axiom with Frederic the Great that a general should always endeavor to catch his opponent unprepared, and deceived as to the quarter and manner in which the blow would fall — "*Immer dem Feind auf den Hosen gesessen.*"

If to be beforehand with an adversary and render him undecided what first move or moves to make is a surprise, then both Wellington and Blucher were to a certain extent surprised. As regards Blucher, it was not such a surprise as nearly ruined the Army of Silesia in February, 1814; but it was a surprise equal to that which enabled him to win the battle of the Katzbach and successfully to transfer his army across the Elbe, at Wartenburg, in 1813. The best proof that Wellington was caught napping is the one error admitted by all his best friends, his leaving 18,000 men— so sorely needed at Waterloo — at Hal, theoretically to defend his right and communications from a movement in that direction by Napoleon, who unquestionably deceived him, or Wellington deceived himself in that respect. Napoleon certainly blinded Wellington as to his intentions and prevented him from assisting Blucher at Ligny; and, if Napoleon had not wasted the best halves of two days, Wellington must have been worsted at Waterloo, because Napoleon could have brought a vast superiority of force, men and material to bear upon him before the Prussians could have possibly got up sufficiently to divert the action of one-quarter of the French army. Hill, on the first day of Gettysburg, 1863, was certainly surprised at finding Buford and the First Corps before him, just as Napoleon was to run unexpectedly into the Allied Army at Lutzen in 1813; and Meade was surprised by Lee's flanking in the Fall of 1863, as was Lee in 1862 through McClellan's discovery by accident, at Frederick, Md., the dispositions of the Rebel troops previous to Antietam.

With an admiration of the sublime heroism of Wellington and the responding sublimity of courage exhibited by his troops at Waterloo, and the more than extraordinary

human resolution, energy, zeal and courage displayed by Blucher and the Prussians, nevertheless, the man of soldierly instincts who has diligently studied the Annals of War and the Manœuvres of Campaigns, must be blind to the lessons of both if he shirks from expressing the disinterested opinion — an opinion the harder to reach because it is co-ordinate with a conviction that Napoleon heaped blunder upon blunder—that the French Emperor did surprise Blucher to some extent and Wellington in a much greater degree. Both magnificently redeemed, their allowing themselves to be caught napping; whereas the brilliancy of Napoleon's beforehand ability was totally and immediately eclipsed by hesitations, half measures and (under similar circumstances) an unparalleled, prodigal squandering—no other word will suit, waste is not strong enough—of time.

From neglect in the discharge of staff duty there were delays which Napoleon himself styled *funeste* (fatal), in getting his army across the Sambre on the 15th June, and Ziethen, who was in his front with the Prussian First Corps, to retard him, was enabled to do so, as much through Napoleon's mistakes as by his own masterly conduct. Although the ablest critics unite in almost unqualified praise of Ziethen's fighting in retreat, which cost Napoleon almost the whole of the 15th, the reading world are not aware that it was about the finest thing of the kind ever done. Buford's magnificent fighting, with his cavalry alone holding back Hill on the first day of Gettysburg, is a similar example of what can be accomplished in such a case by a courageous leader, who possesses the entire confidence of his men.

[Cite authorities in praise of Ziethen: Hamley, Mitchell, Cust, Clausewitz, Gardner, 45, and others.]

It was a question nearly a hundred years ago of what would have been the result if Suworrow and Napoleon had met when both were at their greatest, as experts in the latter's "Military Arithmetic," or prodigal expenditure of human life, and the influence of both upon their respective armies was about equal, with the superiority in the latter respect rather inclining to the Russian. It was Suworrow's *dictum* (see his Maxims, or "Discourse under the Trigger") to attack at once an

enemy not settled, or concentrated, in his position, with whatever troops are in hand, and feed the fight with fresh forces as fast as they come up, trusting to the effects of surprise upon want of preparation. This rule Napoleon should have followed on the 15th P. M. and at Ligny, 16th A. M. If the French troops were in anything like the average condition imputed to them by their advocates, Napoleon should have continued to press Ziethen on the evening of the 15th (Gardner, 45). The fact, however, is that Ziethen had performed his part so well, and Napoleon had filled his role so badly, that on that night the latter's forces lay sprawled all over the Fleurus triangle—apex, Charleroi; sides, 13 miles each, road to Quatre Bras, W., road to Sombreffe, E.; base, 7½ miles—wherever the darkness had overtaken them. Next morning, 16th, the Prussian Second and Third Corps were up. Nevertheless, Napoleon did not begin the battle till nearly 3 P. M. (2.30), the very minute at which Ney began his action at Quatre Bras. The sun rose about 4 A. M. (3.48). The day broke at least an hour earlier. At 8 A. M. Napoleon had only the remains of Ziethen's First Corps before him; at 11 A.M., Pirch's Second Corps, scarcely in position; at 12, Thielman's Third Corps. Therefore, Napoleon had actually thrown away, as if they were valueless—when, on the contrary, they were priceless—at least nine hours of a very fine day. This is beyond question. *There are other* questions which can never be decided. 1st. Did Blucher accept battle at Ligny on the unequivocal assurance that Wellington would assist him, which was not done (Charras, iv. I., 175)? 2d, Was the effect of the unexpected appearance of D'Erlon's corps on the Prussian right-rear more prejudicial to Blucher or to Napoleon? To impartial judgment it must seem most injurious to Blucher. 3d, What was the final result of the day to Napoleon? Undoubtedly he compelled the army of Blucher, in person terribly injured, to withdraw and abandon a large portion of the battlefield, but the Prussians remained in the presence of the French, holding part of their original positions until the next morning, and then withdrew unmolested, and where, and whither, and how they went no Frenchman knew. 4th (Gardner, 121), Even next morning, when an English patrol advanced, driving in the French vedettes, it commu-

nicated with the Prussians (Ziethen still at Brye [?] and Thielman at Sombreffe), and the French were as quiet as lambs taking a morning nap, with no wolves or even sheep-eating dogs in the neighborhood. 5th, What were the relative losses of Napoleon and Blucher? By von Kausler, best authority, the Prussian loss is given (p. 666, &c.,) at 12,076, but this includes Ziethen's casualties of the 15th, making the loss at Ligny, proper, say 10,500. He adds, there are no indications or returns on which to base any calculations of the French loss. (Mitchell, III., 109, places the French losses 16 to 17,000.) No doubt a great many of the missing from Blucher's ranks were recruits, disaffected or worse, from districts recently added to Prussia, who did disperse and run away, but they were no loss in fact. Like Hake's Cumberland Hussars at Waterloo, they would not fight, and were proof against shame, and such poisonous reptiles are more dangerous to those near by than to those farther off. Charras, a Frenchman who is very honest and friendly to his people, if justly antagonistic to Napoleon, sets down the French loss at 11,450, although he elevates the Prussian loss to 18,000, which must include the runaways, some of whom never stopped until they reached the Rhine, demonstrating their utter worthlessness.

To the fight at Quatre Bras on the 16th, simultaneous with Ligny, a very few words will be, and need be, devoted herein. That the English had the best of it is indisputable. Napoleon charges the failure upon Ney. Could the slightest confidence be placed in the words of such an unblushing liar, there might be a doubt. That Ney was deprived of D'Erlon's corps, and it was shuttle-cocked to and fro all day to no purpose, and that thus Ney was crippled, is chargeable to Napoleon himself. He, himself, was the *bete noire* of the whole campaign.

When Napoleon's faculties, at the close of the day (16th) of the battle of Ligny, should have been most awake he went to sleep, and every one else under him seems to have followed his example. It was like Meade and his subordinates not following up, instantly and forcibly, the repulse of Pickett, which counter, Longstreet and other Rebel generals, recently (1893) admitted would have been fatal to Lee; like Meade escorting Lee politely

out of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and leaving him "severely alone" at Williamsport and Falling Waters, with a "swimming" river in flood in his rear, through which, to escape, some of the Rebel troops had to ford neck deep. Next morning, 17th, Napoleon seemed incrusted with "the mildew of apathy." The "Thunderbolt of War," as he was so often styled, the energetic despot of 1813 and 1814, had become a sluggard and a babbler, and lost the better part of another day, 17th, even as he had allowed the Prussians, if he really dared to press them further the night before, to gain ten [12?] hours advance upon pursuit. Defiantly a portion of them stood at daybreak in full sight of those of the French who were awake, and then orderly withdrew. It was not until noon that Grouchy—frightened, as Thiers admits, at the responsibility thrust upon him—received his orders to move off and hold Blucher—hold the fearless, indefatigable Blucher, who snapped his fingers at him, glided off, not secretly, but often visible, on the road to Waterloo and the destruction of the French army there. It was three o'clock before the whole of Grouchy's command were in motion, and about the same hour Napoleon, who, his admirers assert, was itching to get hold of Wellington, went for him, the "Iron Duke," who had been quietly resting in front of Ney on the ground from which he had driven that marshal on the 16th.

When Grouchy—Napoleon's scapegoat to the right—shrinking from the burden imposed upon him, sought to elude that which he knew was beyond his strength, besought his master, "Send Ney, Sire"—Ney to be made the scapegoat on the left, as Grouchy was in the other direction, and on the morrow—"Send Ney and keep me with you;" he was dismissed, peremptorily, to the task assigned to him.

When Napoleon did start he infused some energy into his troops, but as Thiers, his greatest panegyrist and apologist, admits, it took his army certainly three hours to get across the *single* bridge at Genappe, when there was another bridge accessible and fords close by.

Dear reader, stop a moment and reflect! Napoleon censured Wellington for fighting in front of the forest of Soignies, styling it a *defile* through which it was impossi-

ble for the Anglo-Allies, if defeated, to retreat with safety, whereas it was an open wood, without underbrush, traversed by good roads, through which both artillery and cavalry could move without disorder or difficulty, and would have served as a cover and protection to such steady troops as the Anglo-Allies. This supercilious hypercritic forgot—notwithstanding the lesson impressed by the difficulty of crossing on the 17th—that he fought with a *defile* in *his* rear, which, the bridge of Genappe, served, within another day, as a death-trap to his panic-stricken army, in which, also, all his material and most valuable effects were caught, to serve as trophies to the Blucher he affected to despise, and to the Prussians whom he boasted he had annihilated as an army at Ligny.

At length, in the midst of a most severe rain storm, he found the English ready to receive him on the slopes of Mont St. Jean, as the French style the battle, and its field. When Napoleon boasted that "he had them, those English!" and that with "two more hours of daylight he would have made an end of them," the man was beside himself with self-delusion and boastfulness. He had over seven hours next day to make an end of those English before he tried it on, and although he bragged next morning that "the chances were ninety to ten in his favor," he had not made an end of them when the Prussians smashed his right to pieces and played with his flying troops like leopards and wolves with unprotected herds. Think how the loyal North was abused and ridiculed for the panic (so styled and magnified) after Bull Run, 1st, in 1861—where the Unionists did have reserves which stopped pursuit, and which, under any but an incapable, could have converted defeat into a drawn battle, if not a reverse into victory.

There is no doubt that on the 18th, more than once that the beam quivered in the balance until the Prussians threw their decisive weight into the scale, but if Napoleon had not delayed, and wasted nearly half the daylight before he attacked Wellington on the 18th, the Prussians, with all their untiring will, could not have been up to take a hand in the game which they *did* understand.

And now, before entering upon the consideration of the battle of Waterloo proper, there is a very curious fact

which suggests itself. It has been almost invariably the case that the army which takes the decided offensive, not a continuing, "over-from-Saturday" aggressive, but initiates a fresh battle on Sunday, almost always comes to grief. A veteran officer, who as a colonel was at the first Bull Run, 1861, and as a general was present at Appomatox Court House, 1865, often declared and recorded that this was the experience of his four years of desperate fighting, during which time he scarcely ever missed a battle, and played a distinguished part throughout, viz., that he knew that the side which brought on a conflict on Sunday got the worst of it, and that the Rebels were so convinced of this, that with their experience of the fact, towards the end they were very unwilling to take the initiative on the first day of the week.

And now, on the ever memorable 18th June, 1815, amid storm and rain, the day broke on the drenched and bedraggled hosts confronting each other on that soaked field, on which, before night closed, one-sixth of those who fought or simply manœuvred upon it were lying in their blood, dead, dying or wounded.

WATERLOO.

In regard to the generalship displayed by Bonaparte at Waterloo it was in many respects stupidity itself, in spite of all the laudation (*splendide mendax*) bestowed upon it by Thiers and that ilk. The marching out of the eleven French columns to the flourishes and music of their bands, with so much precision and display, was nothing more than a game of braggadocio or bluff. Something more real and grandiose, but on the same principle as that of a Chinese army turning somersets into line amid thunder of gongs and waving of dragon-flags. It was very much like what one of our papers observed of the Panama criminals in court, striking attitudes, melo-dramatic, with grandiloquence. It recalls what Pope Pius VII. said of Napoleon

wheedling when he found that menaces failed, "*Tragediante! Comediante!* It is a great pity that Wellington did not open upon the actors and knock some of the parade out of the fantasia. Having failed to frighten the English by this grand "country circus," truly "wars magnificent array," "blare of bugle and clamor of men," Napoleon continued to add to his blunders, one after another. If the idea ever entered into his head that the Prussians could take a hand in the game, his *immediate* principal attack should have been directed to crush, envelope, and destroy Wellington's left, get in his rear, and gain possession of the road to Brussels. It was exactly what Lee ought to have done at Gettysburg—turned the Union left, captured the trains and reserve-parks in the left rear of the Round-Tops, and occupied those key-points of the field. Sickles stopped that. There was no need of a Sickles at Waterloo, because there was no attempt of the kind made. Any one who will examine a plan of the field, showing the position occupied by the troops on the left, can comprehend the whole situation there. Major-General John Mitchell depicts it in a few words: "The two next brigades of Light Cavalry on the Wavre road—the nearest under General Vandeleur, and the other under Sir Hussey Vivian—form *the extreme left.* Till the arrival of the Prussians this *wing is without support*, completely *en l'air* (in air), according to the French expression, but owing to the open nature of the ground, easily supported, or even thrown back if necessary."

There is no more proof necessary to show the English extreme left was not even menaced than that when, near the end of the battle, nearly 7 P. M., Vivian and Vandeleur were brought over by Lord Uxbridge, as soon as Ziethen's (Prussian 1st) corps was coming up on the road from Ohain, to reinforce the centre. "The sight which greeted them there greatly surprised these horsemen, hitherto out of sight of the actual fighting, and the scene of ruin was such as to persuade them that they had been brought up to cover a retreat."

Instead of Napoleon's launching a column of crushing weight against the English left, "in air, without support," and interposing decisively between Wellington and Blucher; or instead of demonstrating strongly against the British

centre and less against the British right, he attacked in force that which was about the strongest point of Wellington's line —the right—and assaulted a prepared and strengthened stronghold with infantry alone, losing, first and last, in the course of the attempt, 5,000 men, when a previous heavy fire of artillery would have levelled Hugomont, and opened the way for his Foot. When victimized, Grouchy—made the scapegoat of his superior's blunders—endeavored to remonstrate with Napoleon in regard to detaching him (Grouchy), too late, in pursuit of the Prussians, of whom all traces had been lost for ten hours—Napoleon, from the height of his authority and reputation, squelched the Marshal with the question, "If he, Grouchy, pretended to give him lessons?"

Any general of practical experience might have given Napoleon useful lessons from 8 A. M. until 8 o'clock P. M., 18th June, 1815. Clausewitz, the ablest, concisest and clearest military writer of the period, perhaps of any period, in his "Campaign of 1815 in France," observes that Waterloo was a parallel attack [like Borodino], a battle of shock, without manœuvres, and finally the attack upon the centre a matter of immediate necessity rather than the result of a digested plan.

The attack on the British right near 12 M. (11h. 35m.), had no other result than to absorb the attention of Wellington's right wing, and the Brunswick troops brought up in support (Gen. J. Shaw Kennedy, 102).

The relative position of the Chateau Hugomont as regards the English right, in respect to their left, but with infinitely less importance, was represented by the Chateau of Frichemont or Frischermont (Gardner, 192-3), "standing upon a wooded promontory that occupies the angle between that stream [the Smohain] and the Lasne, so that it was in the line of an advance from the direction of Wavre upon Planchenoit. Both the village and the Chateau [of Frischermont] were so far south as to be in prolongation of the French position, and were supposed to be held in observation by the Cavalry on their right flank; *but this was so negligently done* [Marbot to the contrary—see 'Marbot on the French right at Waterloo;' testimony entirely new] that *Prussian patrols were able* to penetrate thus far [close up to the French right] without molestation, and survey the

dispositions of troops [both French and English] in the valley beyond." Remember, this Wood of Frischermont was also known as the Wood of Paris. On its skirts, at 10 A. M., Major Lutzow, with a regiment of Prussian Hussars, replaced the English advanced posts, within cannon shot of the French army (Quinet, 187, 188).

The *first* Act of the great Waterloo drama was the failure against Hugomont. (Consult Sir James Shaw Kennedy, § 100, p. 106.) The *second* commenced at 1.30 P. M., in the attack upon La Haye-Sainte. No critic has attempted to defend the inexcusably vicious or faulty manner in which this was made. It was an assault of 18,000 (Charras IV. Ed., 62 and 272) men in such a concrete mass that the English round-shot ploughed through it with simply a horribly slaughterous effect. By this taking "the bull by the horns" upon the left-centre and left—the term *left* can scarcely be conceded as correct since the English Cavalry, there, were as intact as if simply drawn up on parade—Napoleon lost two-and-a-half to three additional hours of inestimable consequence, nearly 5,000 men and (40?) 15 guns. (S. K., 113. C. 1,278.) Napoleon's admirers absolve him from all responsibility for this useless waste of human life. Neither honesty nor truth can find any excuse for him. The dimensions of the field, General Kennedy said--his (Wellington's) line--was only a mile long to the left, E., and a mile to the right, W., of the bisecting great Charleroi road--altogether two miles; but its contour, its freedom from obstacles to sight or movement, laid it as open to Napoleon's gaze on the heights of Rossomme (C. iv., 1, 261) as if it had been a stage prepared for a spectacle.

The interval between the English and French lines was not over three-quarters of a mile wide, and from the rise or elevation which (and the vicinity) Napoleon occupied, pretty much all day, the whole field was as visible with an ordinary field-glass as a theatre stage from a central box.

The *third* Act was the charge of the 12,000 French Cavalry, which lasted about two hours. Napoleon's Heavy Cavalry suffered such enormous loss and exhaustion that it was good for little or nothing during the rest of the day, although it had accomplished nothing. For this failure Napoleon casts the whole blame upon Ney and his champions and advocates again exonerate him, the Emperor.

Note.—[This is an antitype of the exhausting in vain and vicious manœuvres of the magnificent Cavalry of Apollonius (I. Maccabees, X. §§ 81-2), in his battle against Jonathan Maccabeus at Azotus, B. C. 148. "But the people [Jewish Infantry] stood still, as Jonathan [Wellington] had commanded them: and *so the enemies' horse were tired.* Then brought Simon forth his host, and set them against the footmen [Imperial Guard and supports], (*for the horsemen were spent*) who were discomfited by him, and fled." The battle of Eleasa (B. C. 160), is another type of Waterloo. (1 Maccabees ix. 14-18), as might be clearly shown in its course and results. Thus history constantly, closely and clearly repeats itself.]

Some say the first inopportune employment of this magnificent cavalry—for that it was magnificent no one can deny—was made without his authority, and that the second was equally unjustifiable. To the question why Napoleon allowed this second waste, Mr. Ropes, who is claimed by a critic of experience to have said "the last word that can be said about Waterloo," replies, "Napoleon's whole attention was so occupied with arresting the progress of the on-coming of the Prussians against his right that he could not supervise what was going on towards the centre." Mr. Ropes is not a Pope, actually infallible, and "his word" is *not*, and will not be, the last.

Honest reader, is this credible? Twelve, or ten, or even nine thousand horsemen are not an invisible quantity, and from near Planchenoit (S. K., §§ 116-121), where the fighting was going on between the French and the Prussians, to the rising ground, where the French Cavalry were charging in vain upon the English squares, is an area not greater than the southern portion of Central Park, below the Reservoir, without the majority of the obstacles to seeing everything that occurred thereon. It is just as honest a claim that General Warren, on the Round-Top, could not see what was occurring upon Cemetery Ridge, and in front of it, when he did, and provided against Longstreet's attack against the Union left.

Again, if Napoleon had been such a pre-eminently clear-headed genius, and not supercilious in his self-estimate and depreciation of opponents, he must have known that he had not paralyzed Blucher at and after

Ligny; that he must expect him at Waterloo, as he found him at Mery, 19th, 20th February, when boasting that he had annihilated him five days previous at Champaubert, 10th February, 1814; at Montmirail, 11th; Vauchamps, 14th; Etoges, 14th; and should have made preparations to resist him instead of detaching 33,000 to 35,000 of his best troops on a wild-goose chase in the wrongest direction after Blucher, who, on the 18th June, 1815, stole a march on Napoleon from Wavre to Waterloo, as he did to force the passage of the Elbe at Wartenburg, 3d October, 1813. Had he learned from experience, he would have been prepared for the Prussian intrusion, and then could have given his all-sufficient attention to what was going on in the direction of Wellington.

The fact is, Napoleon, the Corsican Condottiere, was not even as great at that trade as Wallenstein, and was not a great tactician, as was Frederic the Great, the last of the truly great warrior-kings, directing and commanding in reality themselves. Concede that Napoleon was a greater strategist than Frederic, and saw more clearly the *objective* of a campaign, but, in the use of the Three Arms combined, he could not hold a candle to Gustavus and to his two greatest pupils—to Marlborough, to Frederic, and to others, of whom the lay-world know nothing, even by name.

The *fourth* Act, or fourth great attack, was entrusted to Ney, and was the only one made successfully. It established the French in the very centre of Wellington's line of battle. Kennedy (§ 122, 127), said: "It was at this stage of the action that these great qualities of the Duke were chiefly required and most fully displayed. We have already seen that La Haye Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on the opposite side of the road; also the garden and ground on the Anglo-Allied side of it; that Ompteda's brigade was nearly annihilated, and Kielmansegge's so thinned that those two brigades could not hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore, which was between Halkett's left and Kempt's right was unprotected; and *being the very centre of the Duke's line of battle, was consequently that point, above all others, which the enemy wished to gain.* The danger was imminent; and at no other period of the action was the

result so precarious as at this moment. Most fortunately, *Napoleon did not support the advantage* his troops had gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve; *proving that he did not exert that activity and personal energy*, in superintending and conforming to the progress of the action, *which he ought to have done.*"

Reader, fix your attention here. You as well as any expert can decide upon Napoleon's want of generalship on this occasion. First, consider his troops had carried a strong position, and established themselves within sixty yards (S. K., pp. 125-130) of the British centre, where there still were so few troops that an actual gap existed. All Napoleon had to do was to deliver directly forward a forcible blow—a blow for victory. Did he see the gap? Did he recognize the opportunity? Did he improve the success of the Ney? on whom he afterwards threw the blame of the whole disaster—indeed, of the failure of the whole campaign; the Ney he deemed so valuable, in 1812, that he said he would have redeemed him when he thought him lost in Russia, with his reserve-treasures of $75,000,000. No! No! No!

Instead of evincing simple common-sense and carrying out the forward movement, the success won at La Haye Sainte, Napoleon made his next attack diagonally against the strongest part of the British line, the right-centre, where Wellington had his best troops and his freshest reserves.

Now, reader, pause again and consider Napoleon charged upon Ney the loss of the battle because he had prematurely wasted his cavalry, which waste Napoleon should have prevented or mitigated. The fact, however, is, it was not Ney who wasted the cavalry, but Napoleon who suffered it to be wasted under his own eye. Nay; it was neither Ney nor Napoleon, but the *sublime*, tenacious, steadfast, indomitable courage of the English infantry, and the even more sublime courage and example of Wellington, did the work and did it thoroughly. Well might Marshal Bugeaud exclaim: "Oh, that English infantry! It is lucky for the world there are so few of them!" (Marbot, II., 391, 483).

Napoleon claims, with his everlasting, arrogant assumption (Mitchell, III. 98), "Allowing one Englishman to be equal to one Frenchman; a Frenchman is still equal to two

Prussians [none braver], Hanoverians. or soldiers of the Confederation." He traduced Wellington, belittled himself by depreciating the Iron Duke, who was indeed iron and sublime at Waterloo, and styled Blucher "a mere foolhardy hussar, or drunken swash-buckler," though Blucher was the spirit of the allied armies in 1813, again the impelling "Forward" force in 1814, and the real victor, so far as resultiveness, of Waterloo, 1815. Afterwards Napoleon changed his tune, and the dire result wrung from his humbled pride that "the *march of* BLUCHER *on Wavre* [after Ligny] *was one of those lightning flashes of genius which alone emanate from great generals.*" The genius of the drunken "swashbuckler," was greater in this case than the genius of the great war-god of the French.

"Lies please the masses rather than truths," exclaimed Lanfrey (III. 146), although he was only repeating what Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel had declared twenty-five to twenty-six centuries before, and such lies are the utterances to which the masses are best pleased to listen. Napoleon has been so often declared to be so great a man that any falsehood of his own and of his panegyrists, like mendacious Thiers, in his favor, is acceptable and accepted.

Concede that Napoleon in the Waterloo campaign was an invalid, physically unfit for the part he undertook to play, and that pity for emasculated greatness should condone many failings. But Mr. Ropes and his ilk will not have this. In spite of them, however; that he was a partially disabled man must be unquestionably true. His habit of body, his recent change of life, his fat, must have deducted much from the exaggerated quantity of a full Napoleon. Sickness or pain does not always detract from will-power or strength of thought; but it does weaken every characteristic dependent in a greater or less degree on physical vigor. Candid physicians will inform any one that either of the three or four diseases under which Napoleon labored render horseback exercise absolute torture, and occasion pain often insupportable for walking exertion or even remaining upright on the feet. A man is not fit for vigorous thought who is sitting a-straddle on red-hot coals sprinkled with corrosive acid. Lavalette gives us to understand that the disease of which Napoleon died, cancer of the stomach, was already gnawing at his vitals.

The day was drawing nearly to a close, and between 7 and 7.30 P. M. the curtain drawing up upon the *fifth* and concluding Act of this stupendous drama, developing more and more startling situations, up to the final unsurpassably tragic conclusion. "La Garde au feu!"—The Guard into action!—was considered a decisive stroke—"the blow, the Fiat of Fate." For Napoleon to order it so, and *directed* as it was, if he was in his right mind, was inexcusable cruelty. French writers have described the last charge of the Old Guard with such flourishes of trumpets, such feminine bathos, such poetical rhapsody, such transcendental fervor, they have carried away sensible people, and led them to imagine that the Guard had a chance. It was launching—N. W. instead of N.—an inadequate shot obliquely against the strongest plate and backing of a nickel-steel target. This column was Napoleon's last reserve, and Wellington could bring stronger reserves to meet it, with still other reserves behind. And here a remark seems necessary to clear away an error into which every one had fallen. The Old Guard perished in Russia; not enough to form a single regiment escaped. The Imperial Guard was reorganized in 1813, and in that year and in 1814 it suffered to such a degree—as was natural, when it was called upon to do so much, because it alone stood the strain—that even if Napoleon had continued to reign, it would have been simply a skeleton reclothed with new flesh. Disbanded by Louis XVIII., it was hurriedly recruited after Napoleon returned from Elba. There were primary elements in the Guard; as a whole it was a new thing. Marmont, blame him as Napoleon will, a competent judge, says the Guard of 1813 did not behave well on a previous occasion, and again in 1815 at Waterloo.

There is no doubt that the Guard was composed of picked soldiers; St. Cyr complained that Napoleon injured the army by collecting the best and bravest into one body; but that the Guard which appeared at Ligny and at Waterloo was composed of the old soldiers of the Revolution and campaigns immediately succeeding is almost ridiculous, simply because impossible. In twenty-five years of such constant fighting and labors, such marches and exposure, the "Military Arithmetic" of the greatest consumer of life would prove by figures that the original stratum of the original

Consular and Imperial Guard existed in 1815 no more than the dislocated remains from which a scientist, by addition, reconstructs a lost species. (C. IV., I., 65).

Even if the last attack had been thrust forward—direction, N.—from La Haye Sainte, and had *perforated* the British lines, what effective result could have followed with 50,000 Prussians bursting in on flank and rear, and Grouchy with his 33,000 sufficiently occupied by Thielman at Wavre, seven to nine hours' march, at shortest, distant, and at least 20,000 other disposable Prussians firmly in the way. There was never a moment that the Guard had the faintest chance of success. It was stopped, slaughtered, crushed as stone in a breaker; then dissolved, and with it the whole French army. In fact, the greater part of the army was already in a state of dissolution. As a simile, it was like a large cake of ice, still holding together when all the surrounding ice was disintegrating, resolving itself imperceptibly into its original fluid. A moment, and the cake is still apparently intact; then, like the rest, it is gone. The French have a word which Zola applies to the utter overthrow of France in 1870–71—Debacle! No English word furnishes a sufficiently portentous definition. That word expresses everything that occurred. Charras is equally forcible, but employs a sentence for what Zola requires but one word. Charras says, "It was the horrors of Wilna [1812, after the Russian Cataclysm] at the gates of France." And, again summing up, Charras (IV. 1, 323, Text and Note 3) admits that the French losses in killed, wounded and prisoners (Text, 23,600 † 7,000 † 8 or 9,000) was 39,000 or (Note) 37,000; that nothing was wanting to the disaster. Thirty thousand is far below the reality; between casualties on the field, the pursuit, desertion and malingering, the army went to water as an organization. To magnify the catastrophe, Napoleon had prepared no reserve. Berthezene (II., 323), his enthusiastic admirer, says he made no attempt to rally his troops.

The remains of the division of Girard, to all intents and purposes left behind and forgotten near Ligny, might have saved, protected something. It disappeared or was swept away by the *debacle*. Whether its list of casualties did or did not exceed 32,000, 35,000 or 39,000, the Grand

L. of C.

Army was a thing of the past, as was the Grand Army of another vain-glorious general, Gates, after Camden, S. C., in 1780.

As was recorded of the memorable Armada, beaten by the English and Dutch, so it was with Napoleon's Grand Army, annihilated by the Anglo-Allies and Prussians.

"Afflavit Deus et dissipati sunt." "God breathed in anger and they vanished away;" or, "God the Almighty blew, and the Armada went to every wind."

The Prussians revelled in a Carnival of just and justified retribution, for the greater, cold-blooded, commanded brutality and calculated savagery of the French at Ligny and throughout the campaign, and in previous years, deserved no less. The unmanly treatment of their queen and despoliation of their country could scarcely have been expiated by the killing of the last Frenchman of this Grand Army, and it is a pity Blucher did not catch Napoleon.

Captain Alexander Gordon, in his "*Prussiad*," 1759, in honor of Frederic the Great, King of Prussia, uses language which might justly be applied to Blucher's Prussians in their pursuit of the French after Waterloo:

> "Upon the precipice of danger, see
> [BLUCHER] in person, while his blazing sword
> Hangs on the verge of death, and rules the fight.
> Beneath him, in the dark abyss, appear
> Carnage, besmeared with gore, and red-faced Rout;
> *Pursuit upon the back of panting Flight*,
> Hacks terrible, and gashes him [THE FRENCH] with
> wounds."

Napoleon, in his utter selfishness, was still wickedly unjust to the victims of their fidelity to him until he dictated what has been styled the "bombast"—some use much harsher terms—"of St. Helena."

It has even been said that—in contrast to his vain vaunt before the battle, when he boasted, "At last I have those English, with ninety chances out of a hundred in my favor"—he uttered the cruel remark, "That it had always been so with the French since Crecy (1346) [*i. e.*, to be defeated by the English], and he might have expected it." If he did say so, it is very likely that such a conviction induced him to relinquish the pursuit of Sir John Moore,

1809, after he witnessed the overthrow of a portion of the cavalry of his Guard at Benavente, although he had boasted that "he was going to measure himself with Moore, the only general worthy of his encounter," and left the defeat for Soult, claiming that the menace of Austria recalled him to Paris, although he lingered in Spain, at Valladolid, longer than it took Soult to follow up the retiring English to Corunna, simply to be defeated, and witness the fall of Moore there, in the arms of Victory.

MARBOT ON THE RIGHT AT WATERLOO.

In 1830, Colonel [Brigadier-General] de MARBOT wrote to General [Marshal] E. de GROUCHY. (It is curious that no mention has ever been made of Marbot and his reconnoissances toward Wavre until his book came out in 1891. If Napoleon sent orderly officers to Grouchy, why did they not pass through Marbot's posts, if the Emperor was actually expecting Grouchy, instead of being sent by roundabout routes to escape the Prussians. There are strange incompatibilities in Marbot's story to which Ropes, perhaps wisely for his argument, makes no allusion.):

"The Seventh Hussars, of which I was Colonel, belonged to the First Light Cavalry division, attached to the First Corps, 18th June, 1818, the right of that portion of the army commanded in person by the Emperor. When the action began, towards 11 A. M. [Gardner, 11.30 A. M. 222], I was detached from the division with my regiment, [three guns] and a battalion of [light] infantry placed under my command. These troops were posted *en potence*, on the extreme right," [*Marbot does not seem to think much of his superiors' tactics.* "THEY MADE US MANŒUVRE LIKE PUMPKINS." Does he mean that they rolled them about objectless or at random, as boys roll pumpkins against each other to see them rebound or burst!] *behind Frichemont*, facing the Dyle. Through his aid-de-camp, Labedoyere, and an [orderly] *officier d'ordonnance*, whose name I do not recall, detailed instructions were *given me as from the Emperor.*

"These orders prescribed leaving the majority of my troops always in sight of the battlefield, to post 200 Foot in the wood of *Frichemont* [Bois de Paris], a squadron at Lasne [on the Lasne], pushing the posts out to St. Lambert; another squadron half to Couture, half to Beaumont; sending out reconnoissances as far as the Dyle, to the Bridges of Moustier and of Ottignies. [Where was Grouchy at this time? At Walhain (Gardner, 160) about noon or a little later. Walhain is about as far (to the S. E.) from the two bridges, as Wavre was to the N. E. of them. No direct road connected these points, only across-country roads. See Charras (IV., 363, 387 and 653); one bridge, Moustier [Mousty], wood, 40 inches wide; the other of stone, so narrow, 120 inches, that only one carriage could pass at a time. [See Gardner, pp. 119, 167.] The commanders of these different detachments were to leave, every quarter league, small cavalry posts, forming a continual chain even to the field of battle, so that, by means of Hussars galloping from one post to another, the officers reconnoitering could notify me promptly of their junction with the advance-guards of Marshal Grouchy's troops, who should (were to) come up from the direction of the Dyle. I was ordered to dispatch directly to the Emperor the facts transmitted to me by these reconnoissances. I saw to the execution of the orders given to me. After a lapse of fifteen years I find it impossible to state the exact hour at which the detachment directed on Moustier reached that point, the more so since Captain Eloy, its commander, had my injunctions to scout far and wide, and to march with the greatest circumspection. But, remarking that he started from the battlefield at 11 A. M., and had only to cover two leagues, the presumption is he did so in two hours, which will fix his reaching Moustier at 1.30 P. M. Through a note from Captain Eloy, brought to me promptly through the intermediate posts, I learned that he had found no enemy at Moustier [Mousty] nor at Ottignies, and the inhabitants assured him that the French left on the right [E.] shore of the Dyle were passing the river at Limal, Limelette and Wavre. I sent this note to the Emperor by Captain Kouhn, doing duty as Adjutant-Major. He returned, accompanied by an orderly officer (*d' Ordonnance*), who directed me, as from the Em-

peror, to leave the line of posts established towards Moustier, and to order the officer who was examining the defile of St. Lambert to pass beyond it, pushing on as far as possible in the direction of Limal, Limelette and Wavre. I transmitted this order, and even sent my map to the officer commanding detachment at Lasne and at St. Lambert.

"One of my platoons having advanced a quarter league beyond St. Lambert, encountered a platoon of Prussian hussars, several of whom they took, one an officer. I notified the Emperor of this strange capture, and sent the prisoners to him."

[The reader's attention is especially directed to the date of this letter, 1830, fifteen years after the battle. The writer has known the most remarkable instances of vital discrepancies between the statements of officers five years, and even much less, after events, and their diaries; lapses of memory which seemed incredible. Marbot speaks as if he was watching like a cat every crack and corner of the district entrusted to his supervision, whereas Gardner states (192, 115–6) that "the Prussian patrols were able to penetrate thus far [*i. e*, to Frischermont) without molestation, and survey the dispositions of troops [French] in the valley beyond." Marbot's story and the relations of the English and Prussians do not agree at all, and his letter is not borne out by facts known to have transpired, or else the Waterloo story is a myth in whole and in detail. Quinet, (187-8) admits Prussian Cavalry replaced (10 A.M.) the English outposts on the left and remained in observation within cannon shot of the French Army. Where, then, were Marbot's light infantry and guns, left at this very point?]

"Informed by these [prisoners] that they were followed by a great part of the Prussian army, I hastened with a squadron to my detachment at St. Lambert, beyond which I perceived a strong column moving on St. Lambert. I despatched an officer as fast as possible to notify the Emperor, who, in response, ordered me to advance boldly; that this column could be none other than Marshal Grouchy's corps coming from Limal, and driving before him some scattered Prussians to whom the prisoners which I had made belonged. I soon found that the contrary was the fact. The head of the Prussian column approached, although very

slowly. Twice I drove back into the defile the hussars and lancers who preceded it. I sought to gain time in holding back the enemy as long as possible, since they could only with great difficulty debouch from the deep and miry country roads through which they were struggling, and when, at length, compelled by superior force, I had to retreat, the Adjutant-Major, whom I had ordered to go and inform the Emperor of the positive arrival of the Prussians in front of St. Lambert, returned to me, saying that the Emperor directed me to notify this fact to the head of Marshal Grouchy's column, who should be debouching at this moment by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, since it was not coming by those of Limal and Limelette. I wrote to this effect to Captain Eloy, but he, having waited in vain without seeing any troops appear, and hearing the cannon towards St. Lambert, fearing to be cut off, he fell back, therefore, successively on his little posts, and rejoined the main body of the regiment, *resting in view of the battlefield*, about the same moment as the squadrons retiring from St. Lambert and Lasne, driven in by the enemy. The terrible combat which the troops I commanded, and those which came up in support of them, sustained behind the wood Frichemont, occupied my mind too much for me to be able to exactly specify the hour, but I think it must have been nearly 7 P. M., and as Captain Eloy retired at a trot, and could not have been over an hour in returning, I estimate it was towards 6 P. M. when he quit the bridge of Moustier, where consequently he remained five hours. It is, therefore, very surprising that he did not see your [Grouchy's] aide-de-camp, unless this aide mistook the name of the place when he struck the Dyle.

"Such is the statement of the movements made by the regiment I commanded to scout [towards Grouchy's corps] [out from] the right flank of the French army during the battle of Waterloo. The march, the directions of my reconnoissance, were of so momentous importance on this memorable day that Marshal Davout, Minister of War, at the close of 1815, ordered me to state the circumstances which I had the honor to address to him, and which ought to be found [but which can not be discovered] among the War Archives.

"From the facts which I have set forth, I am convinced that the Emperor expected Grouchy's corps on the battle-field of Waterloo. But what foundation was there for this hope? Of that I am ignorant, and I will not permit myself to judge, restricting my narrative to what I saw."

Again I call the reader's attention to several points.

First.—Napoleon was informed that no French troops had passed the Dyle at 1 P. M.; one and one-half hours after some strange troops had manifested themselves on the Heights of St. Lambert, because their appearance gave rise to a discussion between himself and Soult. According to Gardner (155-91), this must have been before noon or shortly after, and same time (Gardner, 194), 1 P. M., Napoleon sent cavalry to menaced quarter.

Second.—Marbot emphasizes the difficulty attending the march of the Prussians on the across-country roads leading to St. Lambert, and that he twice repulsed [could this be so?] their cavalry into the defile from which they were endeavoring to extricate themselves. Prussian Hussars, towards 10 A.M., were already observing the French right in the Wood of Frischermont, or Paris (Quinet, XI., 187).

Third.—That if it was near 6 or 7 P. M. before it was certain that the Prussians were coming, and that Grouchy was not coming, there was still plenty of time for Napoleon to make some effort to effect an orderly retreat, because it was not until after 7 o'clock that he sent forward his Guard to useless slaughter, a body of veterans around which might have been gathered sufficient old troops to save the honor of the army, preserve a great deal of the material, and, if Girard's division had been found in position at Quatre Bras, to have left the memory of Waterloo indeed as a deplorable defeat, but not what the French style a *debacle*, which means an utter dissolution, like the breaking up of an ice-gorge, utter ruin, and utterly ruinous, like the bursting of the Croton Dam in 1841, or the Housatonic in 18—, or the freshet of the Rœliff Jansen in 1879, or the giving way of the Johnstown dam, May 31st, 1890.

Final word: To say that Wellington *won* the battle of Waterloo is a perversion of terms. It is the truth—and that is glory enough for him and his troops—that they

held their own and so long against such terrible odds. Blucher decided, and therefore technically as well as virtually won the battle and gleaned as well as gathered the fruits. An English woman, Harriet Martineau, in her "History of England," with the nice perception of her sex, remarks: "*The success of the battle, however, was* MAINLY *secured by the arrival of the Prussians.*" Where would Wellington have been if one-quarter of Napoleon's best troops had not been diverted from Wellington to meet and to hold off the Prussians while Napoleon was making his desperate throws for probabilities? ANCHOR.



Note to Marbot's Letter.—In the enumeration and details of Napoleon's Grand Army, page 167, &c., Grollman, XIV. Thiel, Band I.: There are no 7th Hussars in Jacquinot's Cavalry Division, d'Erlons First Corps, but there is a regiment, 7th Chasseurs. "Officiers d'Ordonnance" were equivalent to Aides-de-camp to the Commander-in-Chief, in the English service (Mitchell's F. of N., I., 316).

SIR JOHN MOORE vs. NAPOLEON.

The first paragraph on page 24 refers to the questionable conduct in regard to Napoleon's suddenly relinquishing the pursuit of Moore, after crossing the Sierra Guadarama in a blizzard, which, according to Gen. Mathieu Dumas, "rendered the passage more difficult and attended with a greater loss of men than that over the St. Bernard, or [that over] the Splugen in 1800" (Schlosser, Vol. VIII., 52*). Why, after such a display of energy, Napoleon did not continue to follow Moore to the bitter end, is a question which can only be solved by circumstantial, not positive, evidence. Gen. Marbot, to whom Napoleon left a large legacy for his championship, seems unable to explain why Napoleon did not personally finish the war in Spain, and hunt the English out of the Peninsula, especially when his hands were free elsewhere (II., 480) after his marriage with the Austrian. Lanfrey was credited with the first announcement (see Ed. VI., Vol. IV., 456-463) that Napoleon's excuses for quitting his army at Astorga on account of news of the hostile movements of Austria, were not the true cause. A variety of explanations had been proposed, but they appeared in works with a small circulation, and thus none attracted notice until Lanfrey obtained the ear and eye of the world and boldly enunciated the opinion that Napoleon did not like to risk the loss of his reputation by coming into actual contact with the English general, whose ability he admitted, and whose troops, he was to learn, more and more, year by year, were the most dangerous antagonists to tackle, even with the experience of French generals and the war-making power of their veteran troops. Lt.-Col., afterwards Maj.-Gen. John Mitchell, British Army, had antedated Lanfrey

in this opinion about 23 to 25 years since, in his "*Fall of Napoleon*" (Ed. II., Vol. I., 127-129), and even *Murray's Hand-Book for Spain* put the matter plainly in print in 1845, pp. 590, &c., especially 591, *Benavente;* 650, *Lugo;* 654, *La Coruna.* The fact is Napoleon absolutely flunked, and his plea of the necessity for an immediate return to France is on a par with most of his assertions. He abandoned the pursuit at Astorga 1st-2d January, 1809, but did not leave Valladolid, on his way out of Spain, until 7 A.M. 17th (see Charles Dolly's "*Itineraire de Napoleon,*" Paris, 1842). Meanwhile, Moore had given Napoleon's Guard a slap in the face at Benavente, 29th December, 1808; had repulsed Lallemand at Lugo, 6th January, 1809; had halted and offered battle to Soult 6th and 8th January, and was victorious over Soult, before Coruna, 16th January, the day before Napoleon, rushing away, in such a tremendous hurry, as he had claimed, left Valladolid. The writer wishes he had time and space to furnish maps and the comparative evidence gathered, but it will keep. Sufficient to add covert allusions to the giving over of the pursuit of Moore is to be found in Guizot, Thiers and others, and Croker notes (1826) in his Correspondence and Diaries (I., 327-8)—nineteen years before Gen. Mitchell wrote—"An Enigma in Buonaparte's Career," a paragraph in which Wellington is of opinion Napoleon was not so sure of victory as to assume the risk *de se frotter* (rubbing hard) against Moore.

These few pages are no more than a rough sketch, or draught, of an intended work *in extenso*—what a Stammcorps or Cadre is to a Regiment; a skeleton, to be clothed with flesh—recruits, to be moulded or disciplined into a regular organization with full ranks, handsomely uniformed and correspondingly armed and equipped.

It may shock the prejudices of people generally to say that Napoleon did not possess an original mind, and was very much of a Cagliostro, a charlatan; nevertheless, it is so. All the grand conceptions attributed to him were what was said of the Prussian operations, in 1866, against Austria, but even more so of those in 1870-1, against France—IMPROVISATIONS—studied, worked out with labored care and prepared by the application of studies continued through many years. For instance, his first great campaign in Italy

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was simply an application of the plans of Las Minas and Maillebois, who operated on that same ground in 1745, and whose text, maps and plans Napoleon had with him, and had studied out as a student prepares his theses. To apply his knowledge, he had "the magic sword of the revolution, which would cut in the hands of anyone—would cut of itself." Gallenga, the historian of Piedmont, disclosed (1854) the demonstration by Buonaparte of Maillebois' problems, as set forth in the latter's elaborate maps and plans. Recently the Germans have revived this consideration, and Captain von Bremen's article, translated into English, appeared in the *Journal of the U. S. Military Service Institution*, for September, 1892. It can be shown that all the great ideas claimed by the Chauvanistic panegyrists of Napoleon as original with him, were revamped prospects, already begotten before he was born; projects upon which he might have come through the multifarious reading of his subaltern years, of which he boasted to the Emperors and Kings, when, with an upstart's arrogance, he was lording it over them like a suddenly wealthy parvenu among representatives of respectable old families or firms.

Finally SALVANDY, a writer apparently of Bonapartist proclivities, in the *Dictionnaire de la Conversation*, LIII., 555, observes [Elba, Waterloo, St. Helena]: "This finish, or outcome, of the Drama of the Empire completely attests the essential fragility of Napoleon's power. * * Nothing proves more clearly that the pyramid of brass was based upon sand. * * That which perished in his hands did not perish solely through his deed, but also through the deed [or action] of his destiny. That [again] is composed of problems to all appearances insoluble. But this may be said with certainty: *He* [Napoleon] *fell because he ignored justice. No one will dare to add that he maintained himself with justice.*" This injustice manifested itself wherever an opportunity offered, but culminated in such cowardly calumnies as those against Vandaume, a most brutal but most able commander, in 1813; against Augerau, who saved French honor at Castiglione, in 1796, and Marmont, who served his master only too faithfully, in 1814; but last, and especially, Ney and Grouchy in the Waterloo campaign. Napoleon could not be truthful, could not be honest, could not be just. (MARMONT, 9, 415, corroborates.)

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